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Recent advances in molecular genetics methods have provided new means of
determining the genetic bases of human behavioral traits. The impetus for the
use of these approaches for specific behaviors depends, in large part, on previ-
ous familial studies on inheritance of such traits. In the past, a finding of a
genetic basis for a trait was often accompanied with the idea that that trait is
unchangeable. We discuss the definition of "genetic trait" and heritability and
examine the relationship between these concepts and the malleability of traits
for both molecular and nonmolecular approaches to behavioral genetics. We
argue that the malleability of traits is as much a social and political question as
it is abiological one and that whether ornot a trait is genetic has littlerelevance
to questions concerning determinism, free will, and individual responsibility for
actions. We conclude by noting that "scientific objectivity" should not be used
to conceal the social perspectives that underlie proposals regarding social
change.
"We used to think our fate was in our stars. Now weknow, in large
measure, ourfate is in our genes" (J. Watson, quoted in Time
Magazine, March 20, 1989).
The power ofnew genetic technologies has revolutionized the study ofthe biological
underpinnings ofmany human traits. In the last several years, these new approaches have
been used in attempts to identify genes associated with certain human behaviors.
Geneticists employing linkage studies have reported the location ofgenes correlated with
alcoholism [1], manic depressive illness [2, 3], schizophrenia [4], Alzheimer's Disease
[5-7], sexual orientation [8] and aggression [9]. In several cases, the initial reports of
positive results have been subsequently withdrawn or severely criticized [10-14].
Nevertheless, these reports, and the publicity attending them, have given renewed public
attention to the thorny subject ofgenetics and human behavior.
Biological explanations ofhuman behavior have a long history. One important belief
often associated with these explanations is that, ifa behavior can be said to be "genetic,"
then that behavior is fixed and unchangeable. We will refer to such a belief as "genetic
fatalism." During the flrst quarter of this century, researchers in the United States con-
cluded that the newly developed I.Q. tests measured inborn and fixed intelligence [15,
16]. They argued that the low I.Q. scores of immigrants from Southern and Eastern
Europe meant that the influx ofthese "biologically inferior" people into the United States
would have deleterious effects on the quality of the gene pool in the United States. In
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1975, E. 0. Wilson stated that the science ofsociobiology, which applies Darwinian evo-
lutionary theory to the study of animal and human societies, showed that differences
between men and women in societal achievements were genetically based. These differ-
ences cannot be easily eliminated, according to Wilson, since "the genetic bias is intense
enough to cause a substantial [sexual] division oflabor even in the most free and egalitar-
ian future societies" [17]. Subsequently, in a modified version of this genetic fatalism,
Wilson, while ceding that genetic does not necessarily mean unchangeable, suggested
that efforts to interfere with our evolutionary heritage through social engineering would
generate new social problems [18]. In 1991, researchers Michael Bailey and Richard
Pillard argued that there is a substantial genetic contribution to homosexuality [19]. Such
a conclusion, they contend, undermines a fundamental argument for discrimination, that
homosexuality is a "social corruption" [20]. Implicit in the researchers' arguments for the
social acceptance of homosexuality is the assumption that, if the behavior is genetically
based, then gay men have little choice overtheir sexual orientation.
Historically, beliefs in genetic fatalism, particularly as they relate to human behavior,
have been used to inform and influence social policy. Hereditarian explanations ofhuman
behavior have served to rationalize andjustify existing social arrangements, such as class
structure, male dominance, and xenophobia. It has been argued that these phenomena are
universal (present in all societies), genetic, and resistant to change. Further, it is some-
times claimed that, even if these traits could be changed, they are "optimal" in the sense
that they represent the best possible result given an imperfect human nature. Thus, most
often, genetic fatalism has been used in a conservative fashion, to support the naturlness
ofthe statusquo.
However, conservative social policy is not a necessary corollary of arguments for a
fixed biological basis for human behavior. In the early part ofthis century, eugenics poli-
cies, based on beliefs in genes for intelligence and other social traits, were advocated by
socialists as well as conservatives [16,21]. While the right supported eugenics toprevent
"degradation ofthe gene pool," the left offered alternative rationales foreugenics, includ-
ing the goal of improving the lot ofthe working class. Bailey and Pillard, who base their
conclusions on twin studies [19], and Simon LeVay, who studied therelationship between
brain structure and homosexuality [22], hope that their results will lead to greater social
acceptance ofhomosexuals [20, 23].
Further, not all those who pursue studies on the biological components of behavior
subscribe to the conceptofgenetic fatalism. Melvin Konner, a sociobiologist [24], Sandra
Scarr, who studies the biological basis of intelligence [25], and Patricia Davidson, a
mathematics curriculum developer who cites studies on the effect of brain differences
between boys and girls on math performance in her work [26], all believe that traits with
abiological basecan bechanged by changing the social and educational environment
In this paper, we examine these different perspectives on the social implications of
studies on the biological basis ofhuman behavior. We begin by reviewing the definitions
of some of the concepts of human behavioral genetics and comparing the various
approaches used to study the genetic basis of traits. We then discuss the malleability of
traits with either a strong environmental or a strong genetic component. Finally, this
background is used to explore the social policy implications ofbehavior genetic studies
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and to examine therelationship between free will andgenetic determinism.
In discussing genetic theories of human behavior, we find it useful to divide the
approaches into two categories: nonmolecular and molecular. Nonmolecular studies
involve such disciplines as sociobiology, psychology (e.g., identical twin and adoption
studies), anatomy (e.g., the study ofanatomical brain difference between gay and straight
men or between men and women), and physiology (e.g., the study ofparticular receptors
in the brains ofpeople with and without alcoholism). Molecular studies are designed to
obtain information aboutthe actual genes orgeneproductsresponsible for thebehavior.
The distinction between molecular and nonmolecular studies is important because,
for the most part, the methodologies used are quite different. Since the molecular studies
involve a search for the genes themselves, certain aspects of the technical analysis and
interpretation arerelatively straightforward. In contrast, nonmolecular studies rely on less
directevidence for the existence ofgenes correlated with abehavior. Forinstance, the use
of the abstract concept ofheritability developed by quantitative geneticists is essential to
this approach. Furthermore, there is an overall discernable difference in the attitudes of
molecular and non-molecular researchers with regard to the malleability of biological
traits. This difference can lead to contrasting views on the political and social implica-
tions offinding that a trait is "biological."
GENETIC FATALISM, HERITABILITY AND NONMOLECULAR STUDIES
Current research endeavors to find specific genes associated with human behavioral
traits derive directly from decades ofbehavior genetics research. Without the suggestions
from nonmolecular studies ofa genetic basis for schizophrenia [27], alcoholism [28, 29]
and, mostrecently, homosexuality [19,22], there would beconsiderably less incentive for
the molecular biologists to devote their time to gene-hunting projects. Consequently, it is
important to evaluate the methods used in nonmolecular studies of behavior in order to
determine how solid a basis there is for the molecular studies. Elsewhere, we have dis-
cussed some of the pitfalls in approaches, such as studies of identical twins [30]. Here,
we consider the language used in assessing genetic contributions to human behavior and
theassumptions that underlie this terminology.
The modifier "genetically determined" is used to describe a trait that exhibits the
same or a similar phenotype in all usual environments. Number ofears and hair color are
two examples of genetic traits. Unlike "genetic fatalism" which assumes that a genetic
trait cannotbe changed, the worddetermined does not necessarily indicate how malleable
that trait might be. Hair color, for example, is readily changed by dyes. And, in a society
that punished criminals by cutting off one or both ears, the number of ears would be a
malleable trait. Moreover, since our knowledge of the interactions between genes and
environmentisquite limited, it is often notpossible to ascertain how the genotype will be
expressed in a new untested environment.
Instead of calling a trait genetically determined, it is often stated that a trait has a
large genetic component. If "large genetic component" is taken simply as a synonym for
genetically determined as defined above, then this usage is unproblematic. However, it is
meaningless to attribute a portion ofa trait to a genetic component and the remainder to
the environmental component. For example, one cannot say that 60 inches of a six-foot
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man's height are due to his genes and 12 inches are due to theenvironment.
Quantitative geneticists introduced the conceptofheritability in order to allow quan-
titative estimation of the importance of genes in contributing to a trait [31]. Heritability
does not provide information on the genetic component of a trait in any one individual.
Rather, heritability is a measure of the fraction of the variability of the trait in a popula-
tion of individuals living in a particular range of environments that is due to genetic dif-
ferences within the population. More precisely, heritability is defined as the variance of
the trait seen in a population due to genetic differences divided by the total variance in
the trait. The variation in the trait thatcan beattributed to genes is called thegenetic vari-
ance and the total variation is the phenotypic variance. The phenotypic variance is the
sum ofgenetic and environmental variances plus the variance due to the complex interre-
lationships between genes and the environment. While "heritable trait" is synonymous
with "genetic trait," a genetic trait, as we show below, need not have ahigh heritability.
An accurate estimate of a heritability coefficient depends, in part, on being able to
separate the contributions to the phenotypic variance arising from genetic and from envi-
ronmental causes. However, there are two contributions to the phenotypic variance that
make this separation difficult genetic-environmental covariance andgenetic-environment
interaction [31].
Genetic-environmental covariance occurs when certain genotypes and certain envi-
ronments are associated. Forexample, let us assume thatI.Q. is influenced both by hered-
ity and by the degree of intellectual stimulation in the environment. If that is the case,
then parents with high I.Q.'s, due in part to genes, will tend to provide a milieu for their
children that enhances their performance on the tests beyond that expected from their
"intelligence genes." Itis a matterofdebate whether the enhancedperformance due to the
covariance should be included in the genetic orenvironmental variance in the calculation
ofa heritability coefficient.
Genetic-environment interaction occurs when one genotype may lead to aphenotype
that is considered better in environment 1 than in environment 2, while another genotype
might be better in environment 2 than 1. For example, students with different genotypes
for math performance (assuming that such "math genes" exist) might require different
pedagogical approaches in order to reach their full potential. Patricia Davidson argues
that girls learn certain fundamental principles in mathematics differently from boys [26].
Ifthis were true, itcould well be thatproviding the best teaching approach forgirls as the
standard would lead to girls outperforming boys on SAT tests. In this example, such
changes in the environment will result in large changes in the heritability estimates for
the trait
Dissecting out the importance ofthese different contributions to phenotypic variance
is a very difficult task. In studies of the heritability of a trait in people, researchers are
obviously unable to perform the type ofcontrolled experiments that can be used in heri-
tability studies of nonhuman animals and plants. For example, in order to measure gene-
environment interactions, one would need many groups ofpeople with individuals within
each group having the same genotype. Then, for every group, each individual would be
placed in a different environment. Since such experiments cannot be conducted with peo-
ple, researchers studying human traits must either ignore the covariance and interaction,
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assume that they have little effect on heritability coefficients, or attempt to apportion
these factors between purely environmental and genetic variances. These various strate-
gies for dealing with the inherent difficulties of determining heritability have elicited
strong criticisms [32].
It is a paradoxical consequence of the definition of heritability that traits normally
regarded as being genetic do not necessarily have a high heritability. As indicated above,
the trait of having two ears is a genetic one; in all usual environments practically every
individual will have two ears. Since variation in ear number is rarely due to a genetic dif-
ference, but rather more commonly is the result of an accident or other environmental
event, the genotypic variance is much less than the environmental variance. Thus, the
heritability, the genotypic variance divided by the total variance, is close to zero. Other
examples ofthis property ofheritabilities are traits that are closely connected with repro-
ductive fitness. These traits, though clearly genetic, tend to have low heritabilities [31].
We emphasize that the heritability ofa trait is defined for aparticular population and
for a particular range ofenvironments. This point was raised mostprominently during the
debate about I.Q differences between the races [33]. Opponents of the view that the dif-
ference between the average I.Q score of whites and blacks is genetically based empha-
sized that a finding of high heritability of I.Q. among the white population in the United
States provides no information about its heritability among African-Americans, since the
two groups experience very different environments. Moreover, there is no theoretical rea-
son why performance on I.Q. tests and the heritability of I.Q. could not change if the
environment (social, psychological, nutritional, etc.) ofevery child were improved.
The heritability ofintelligence, as measured by I.Q. tests, has been estimated to be as
high as 80% [34, 35]. This high figure, if correct, means that the differences currently
observed in I.Q. among people are largely due to genetic differences. Based on this esti-
mate, it has, at times, been concluded that these differences are irremediable and cannot
be significantly reduced by compensatory education [34]. But, an estimate ofheritability
provides no information on what the impact of novel educational approaches might be.
As a result of interactive effects, a change in environment could have a greater effect on
the I.Q. scores of some children than on others. In other studies of identical twins,
researchers have claimed that such traits as personality, job satisfaction, and religious
interests are approximately 50% heritable [36]. These findings have led some commenta-
tors to argue that the home environment and other life experiences have little effect on
these behavioral characteristics [37, 38].
Despite this fundamental feature of population genetics, some scientists and more
especially the popular media have tended to equate high heritability with "large genetic
component" and have assumed thatboth concepts imply genetically fated.
The heritability concept was invented for analyzing the inheritance of traits that are
believed to arise from the combination ofthe effects ofmany genes [39]. For such highly
polygenic traits it is questionable whether molecular methods, which study the operation
of a single gene or of a few genes at most, will be useful for the foreseeable future in
determining a genetic causal mechanism. Consequently, most researchers who study the
genetics ofcomplex human behavioral traits such as intelligence and aggression continue
to usenonmolecularapproaches and focus on obtaining heritabilityestimates.
515Alper andBeckwith: Geneticfatalism andsocalpolicy
MOLECULAR APPROACHES TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR GENETICS
Ifatrait is influenced by a single gene or, at most, a few genes, then it is often possi-
ble to obtain detailed information about the causal mechanism of that trait by using
molecular approaches. For certain non-behavioral conditions, such as cystic fibrosis,
many mutations in a single gene have been discovered in the last few years and a great
deal has been learned about the gene product and its function [40]. Cystic fibrosis studies
have already dramatically increased our understanding ofthe biochemical andphysiolog-
ical processes responsible for the disease. In a more complex condition with behavioral
aspects, Huntington's disease, RFLPc analysis showed linkage to markers on chromo-
some 4 [41]. This knowledge led to the development of diagnostic tests that, together
with a family history, can determine theprobability that a person at risk for Huntington's
disease will develop the disease. Most recently, a candidate for the Huntington's disease
gene has been identified [42].
The RFLP technique has also been applied, although with less success, topsychiatric
diseases such as MDI [2, 3] and schizophrenia [4]. A wave ofrecent articles describe the
difficulties andpitfalls involved in linkage studies, especially ofcomplex psychiatric dis-
eases [11, 13, 30, 43-47]. These include problems in establishing definitive diagnostic
criteria for complex behavioral traits, errors in experimental design, and questions con-
cerning the appropriate statistical measures for deciding that a linkage is significant.
Thus, despite the more precise nature of the linkage approach to studying human behav-
ior, even molecular studies are prone to serious error. However, molecular studies can be
readily repeated by other researchers and, as a result, any flaws in the original studies are
likely to be revealed.
Unlike the molecularstudies, itis questionable whether twin and adoption studies are
truly replicable. The variation in the method of ascertainment of subjects, the array of
social settings in which such studies are done, and the use ofdifferent criteria and mea-
surements to define a behavior make such heritability studies incommensurable. In fact,
different familial studies of the inheritance of such traits as intelligence have produced
dramatically different heritability estimates. A widely cited articlereviewing these studies
simply combined the various heritability estimates rather than providing critical evalua-
tions ofeach ofthe studies [35].
THE MALLEABILITY OF GENETIC TRAITS
There is little debate about the proposition that, in principle, even highly heritable
traits can be changed. Debate arises concerning the questions of whether such changes
are possible in practice and, ifpossible, whether such changes would be accompanied by
unacceptably high costs.
Researchers engaged in molecular studies of human behavior and human diseases
tend to be optimistic about the possibility ofchanging traits [48, 49]. Once the molecular
orbiochemical cause ofadisease is determined, it may be possible todevelop a treatment
involving either gene therapy (delivering the non-mutant form of the gene to the patient)
orenvironmental therapy (delivering orcountering the effect ofthe altered gene product)
in order tocorrect thebiochemical problem.
An analysis of the variability of genetic conditions suggests that this optimism may
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underestimate the complex etiology of genetic diseases. Consider MDI. Suppose that
MDI is discovered to be due to a mutation in a gene involved in abiochemical pathway
that results in the decreased concentration of a chemical in the brain required for normal
behavior. It is possible that, despite the fact that a chemical is involved, MDI is triggered
by environmental factors like stress that lower the concentration of the chemical from a
low but tolerable value to an intolerably low one. In this case, counseling involving, for
instance, stress management techniques could possibly be a more appropriate therapy
than one involving gene therapy or medication, which mightbe accompanied by undesir-
able side effects.
Now suppose that the etiology of MDI is even more complex; the condition diag-
nosed as MDI might arise from several distinct causes. Some individuals diagnosed with
MDI mightcarry the mutation making them susceptible toparticularenvironmental influ-
ences. Others might be affected by a different mutation, one which will manifest itselfin
essentially all environments. Still others might have a condition that is entirely environ-
mentally induced. It may well be the case that as genetic mapping techniques improve,
the dissection ofcomplex behavioral conditions like MDI, schizophrenia, and alcoholism
into separate diseases, each with its own etiology, can be accomplished. (We are assum-
ing for the sake of argument here that all cases of these diseases are genetic. We doubt
that this is so.) In this eventuality, specific treatments might be needed for individuals
with specific forms ofthe disease.
But even in the case of a disease caused by a single genetic mutation that is
expressed in all environments, it may not be a simple matter to find a treatment or cure.
Although the exact amino acid change in hemoglobin that causes sickle-cell disease has
been known for over three decades [50], there is still no cure and none of the treatments
for the disease are based on the knowledge of the molecular basis of the disease [51].
Given the rapid progress in molecular biology, there is more optimism now that charac-
terization ofdisease genes can lead to treatments. In some cases, such as therecently dis-
covered gene for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, the identification of the function of the
gene product immediately suggests possible means of intervention [52]. However, this is
arelatively unusual example, and the speed with which knowledgeofthe genetic basis of
a disease can be translated generally into treatments orcures is highly uncertain.
Researchers involved in non-molecular studies ofthebiological basis ofbehaviorare
usually less sanguine about the possibility of change. Some have expressed the opinion
that evidence for a genetic basis for a behavior indicates that it will be very difficult to
change that behavior [53, 54]. Since, according to researchers, complex behavioral traits
result from the effects of many genes [39], it is difficult to see how knowledge of the
gene products will be of value in developing biological or chemical interventions.
Another argument that is used by some who work in this area is thatbehavioral traits are
the product ofoptimal Darwinian natural selection, and, thus, could be changed only by
environmental changes that might have severenegativeconsequences for society [18].
Even ifone accepts (as we do not) the high estimates ofheritability reported for such
traits as intelligence (-0.8), it does not follow that the trait is difficult to change. A high
heritability simply means that very little ofthe variation in the trait from one individual to
another is the result ofdifferences in the environments experienced by thatpopulation of
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individuals. No conclusion can be drawn about how the genes would respond to a differ-
ent environment. In fact, studies by Scarr and Weinberg [55] and by Schiff et al. [56]
have shown that changing family environment (race or social class) can have a substan-
tial effecton I.Q. scores.
It has been argued that, although changing the environment may affect performance
on intelligence tests, such environmental changes can do little to eliminate inequality
because they will simply raise the performance levels ofall children to the same degree,
leaving differences intact [34]. This argument ignores the possibility of a genetic-envi-
ronmental interaction. Even if the lower performance by girls on the SAT mathematics
tests is due to sex differences in hormones orin brain structure, this does not mean thatin
every educational environment girls will achieve less than boys. In recent years there has
been a greatdeal ofprogress made in determining the types ofenvironments in which the
mathematical potential ofgirls can be realized [57, 58].
Nor does the fact that a trait has been subjected to evolutionary pressures mean that
it is unchangeable or that it cannot be changed without causing harm to either the indi-
vidual or society. A species is exposed to only alimited variety ofenvironments through-
out its history, and the process ofnatural selection can operate only within this range of
environments. Although one could make the argument that the genes responsible for a
trait that has been subject to evolutionary pressures are in some sense optimal for the
environments encountered at some point in the history of the species, we have no idea
how these genes would interact with the currentenvironments.
Perhaps the basic fallacy underlying the nature-nurture debate is the assumption that
ifa human behavioral trait is "genetic," it will, ofnecessity, be much less malleable than
an "fenvironmental" one. It is our contention that the potential malleability of a trait
depends on the details of the development ofthat trait and on our state ofknowledge of
it. Knowing only that the trait is genetic, or even that it is the result of a single gene
mutation, does not provide enough information to assess its malleability. PKU [59] and
Tay-Sachs Disease [60] are both caused by single gene mutations. PKU, however, is
readily treated by a modification ofthe diet, while Tay-Sachs Disease remains refractory
to treatment.
Traits that are "environmentally determined", i.e., show the same expression irre-
spective of the genotype, also vary in the degree to which they can be modified. Many
vitamin deficiency diseases are easily treated by supplying the missing vitamin.
However, children raised in poverty who were subject to deprivation and abuse may
develop psychiatric problems as adults that are very difficult to alleviate. And children
who were exposed to environmental toxins such as lead may suffer from biochemical or
structural changes that are essentially irreversible.
SOCIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC BEHAVIORAL STUDIES
We have presented arguments critical of the views that (1) genetically controlled or
highly heritable traits are unchangeable, (2) even if these traits can be changed, they
should not be changed because the existing forms are the result of Darwinian selective
pressures, and (3) genetically-based traits are necessarily more difficult to change than
environmentally-based ones. However, these arguments do not address the philosophical
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and ethical question ofwhether society should attempt to intervene in the development of
human behavioral traits and abilities and the intertwined economic and political question
ofwhether society should devote its resources to effecting the change. Many of the traits
that are the focus of discussion involve inequalities. African-Americans score lower on
I.Q. tests; women score lower on certain advanced mathematical tests at the upper range
oftest scores. Shouldoursociety allocate funds to fosterequality in mathematics between
the sexes by learning how to improve the math performance of women and to change
social conditions so that girls receive as much encouragement at home and in school as
boys in mathematics? Or would those funds be better spent on exploiting the talents of
the boys who already score highest on the aptitude tests (assuming there was not enough
money forboth purposes)?
Consider an analogy with genetic diseases. Many of these diseases affect only a tiny
proportion ofthe population, and some are not fatal or even severely disabling, yet great
efforts are made to understand their etiology and to find cures and treatments. Shouldn't
comparable efforts be made to investigate and possibly quantify the effects ofdisadvanta-
geous environments on I.Q. and mathematics test performance? In our highly technologi-
cal society, which is becoming increasingly dependent on an educated work-force, the
substandard performance ofa large proportion ofpeople of a particular gender or ethnic
group means that the potential contribution to society of millions ofpeople is being lost.
We would argue that systematic studies ofenvironmental factors such as inadequate diet,
unsuitable pedagogical techniques, and prejudicial attitudes about the intellectual ability
of women and minorities are at least as essential as the search for genetic factors that
mightresult in poorerperformance on the tests.
The question of whether society should intervene is a philosophical, economic, and
political one. It cannot be decided by resort to scientific arguments. We have argued here
that there is no foundation for basing that decision on the knowledge that the trait has a
strong genetic base or has environmental origins since genetic traits can be as malleable
or non-malleable asenvironmentally affected traits.
Consider two children who do poorly in school. In one case, the school failures may
be due to a deprived childhood, poor early nutrition, or other aspects of the child's back-
ground. In the other, it may be due to the specific genetic make-up ofthe child (given the
educational environment). In neither case, can we predict how much the intellectual per-
formance of the child can be changed by intervention. Nor is there any basis fordeciding
that one type of educational program would work for child 1 and not for child 2. If we
wished to improve educational performance, a reasonable strategy might involve trying
alternative educational techniques. Of course, it is possible that a gene might be found
that is responsible for an intellectual deficit and that studies on the gene and its product
might give clues to possible biochemical intervention. But, even if such a gene did exist,
the strategy based on educational and other environmental interventions would remain
appropriate. Moreover, given the present level ofbiological knowledge, even taking into
account the extraordinary rate ofprogress in the last few years, we believe that an under-
standing ofgenetic components ofeducational performance is very faroffindeed.
Even if the optimism of the molecular researchers is justified and the program of
identifying genes that cause disease and social pathology based on this knowledge of
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genetics is successful, we believe the program itself is problematic. Suppose, as is likely,
this program is successful in finding treatments for certain well-characterized diseases.
Then there will be strong pressures toregard this program based on a "technological fix"
as the solution to theproblem ofall conditions which are thought to arise from the actions
of a single gene or a few genes [61].These pressures will come from the researchers
themselves who will seek expanded funding for a research field that has shown consider-
able success. It may also come from conservatives who do not believe social problems
can orshould be amelioratedbygovernmental social interventions.
There is little doubt that the biotechnological program will ultimately result in treat-
ments and cures for many genetic diseases. However, this program, ifcarried out to the
exclusion ofother means ofameliorating social problems, will be of limited use. If, as we
havesuggested, MDI isactually alabelgiven to aconstellation oftraits with different eti-
ologies, the search for a biotechnological treatment or cure may be of benefit to only a
fraction of thosepeople with MDI. The search may be more useful, in fact, in identifying
the class ofpeople for whombiological or chemical interventions would not be useful.
Alcoholism may be an even more instructive example of the possible negative conse-
quences of thebiotechnological approach. On the basis ofthe present state ofknowledge,
we believe that it is notunlikely that some forms ofalcoholism may be correlated with a
genetic predisposition, while other forms are purely environmental. If research on alco-
holism is focused exclusively on the genetic forms, people with the environmentally
induced forms ofthe diseasemay not behelped. Equally troubling, however, is the possi-
bility that if it is recognized that some forms of alcoholism are genetic and others are
environmental, there may be a tendency on the part of society and of people with alco-
holism themselves to blame those who have the environmentally induced form of alco-
holism. According to this view, people with the environmentally induced form, unlike
those with thegenetic form, should have much more control over their behavior.
FREE WILL AND GENETICS
As the alcoholism issue illustrates, the belief that people bear no responsibility for
aspects of their behavior that are genetically influenced can becorrelated with a genetic
fatalistperspective. These aspects are regarded as being beyond their control. People are
thought to be more responsible for non-genetically influenced behavior because it is
believed that such behavior can be changed. In this section, we discuss the relationship
between free will, genetic traits, and societal attitudes towards people whose behavior is
considered to be "deviant" by the majority of the population. It is our contention that
knowledgethat a behavior isgenetically rather than environmentally determined (or vice
versa) is essentially irrelevant to deciding whether a person bears responsibility for that
behavior.
In discussing their study on the genetic basis of male homosexuality, Bailey and
Pillard [20] argue that, if it can be shown that homosexuality has a genetic basis, then
people would be moreprepared toaccepthomosexuals and not discriminate against them.
Thisargumentappears to be based on thefollowing premises: (1) ifhomosexuality is not
genetic, then either (a) people have chosen of their own free will to be homosexuals, or
(b) homosexuality is an illness brought on by such environmental factors as abnormal
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family interrelationships; and (2) if homosexuality is genetic, then it is fated; potential
homosexuals have no choice over their sexual orientation. (This latter argument would
also apply to homosexuality if individuals are born gay because of intrauterine environ-
mental effects.) If (la) is true, then people who believe that homosexuality is unnatural
could argue that homosexuals have chosen a deviant path. If(lb) is true, then homosexu-
ality might be treated in the same manner as other nongenetic psychiatric illnesses. If(2)
is true, then homosexuality might be considered to be "natural" and, therefore, should be
accepted as partofthe normal range ofhuman behavior.
There are several problems with this argument. First, consider the analogous argu-
ment for alcoholism. The implications ofpremises (la) and (lb) are completely parallel,
but those of (2) must be modified. In this society, even people who believe that alco-
holism has a genetic basis do not regard it as a "natural" or "normal" condition; alco-
holism is considered by many to be a disease. Thus, showing that homosexuality has a
genetic origin would not in itselfbe sufficient to convince manypeople thathomosexuali-
ty is "natural" and that homosexuals should be treated as the equals of heterosexuals. In
fact, during the Nazi era, part ofthejustification for the extermination ofhomosexuals as
well as Jews was the claim that their "traits" weregenetic and, thus, a threatto the "racial
hygiene" ofthe German nation.
Second, as we have argued in this paper, there is no reason to believe that environ-
mentally controlled traits are any more malleable than genetically controlledones. We are
not taking a position on the philosophical doctrine ofdeterminism; a philosophical deter-
minist would say thatall ofour actions are determined and that free will does notexist. It
is our position that if one is not a philosophical determinist, then it is contradictory to
believe that we possess free will regarding (and are thus responsible for) behavior that is
environmentally controlled, but that we lack free will regarding biologically controlled
behavior. For example, one person might be able to control angry rages brought on by a
hormonal imbalance due to an altered genotype more easily than anothermight be able to
control the same typeofrages broughtonby yearsofsuffering as an abusedchild.
Third, suppose that subsequent research shows that, although homosexuality is
genetic, it is incompletely penetrant (i.e., some individuals with the genotype are not
homosexuals). In fact, the Bailey-Pillard study itselfshows that individuals with identical
genetic makeup (identical twins) areonly 52% concordant forhomosexuality. Whatis the
explanation for the other 48% who are not concordant? Assuming that the "homosexual
genotype" exists and is present if a man is gay, then one possible explanation is that the
straight cotwin chose to be straight of his own free will. Another is that environmental
forces (e.g., societal pressure) were strong enough to overcome the natural homosexual
tendencies in the cotwin who became straight. Thus, Bailey and Pillard's own data can be
used to argue that, if there is a genetic component to homosexual behavior, there is still
substantial play in thedevelopmentofthatbehavior.
If it is proved that either of these explanations is correct or that male homosexuality
is notgenetic atall, would Bailey andPillard then argue that itis acceptable forsociety to
regard these men as deviant because their behavior is not determined by their genes?
Clearly they would not. We agree with Bailey and Pillard that discrimination against
homosexuals is wrong. But it is wrong for reasons that involve ethics and morality. The
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"naturalness" ofbehavior, the flexibility in the development ofabehavior, the desirability
of changing the behavior, and the responsibility of an individual for his or her behavior
rarely have anything to do with whether the behavior is environmental or genetic in
origin.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed the various positions on the implications ofbehavior
genetics research for social policy. We have stressed the crucial importance for these dis-
cussions of a correct understanding of the concept of a genetically determined trait, the
definition and meaning ofheritability, and oftherelationship between these characteriza-
tions of traits and the malleability of those traits. While we have seen remarkable
advances in molecular genetics in recent years, we are still far from being able to use the
results ofresearch in this field to effect changes in the manifestations ofbehavioral traits
or even to determine the malleability of those traits. Further, the complex interaction of
genetics andenvironment, which hasbeen emphasized by the most thoughtful geneticists,
will always make the application ofscientific results to such issues as education and so-
called deviantbehavior problematic.
Policy decisions on these issues depend on more than the feasibility ofgenetic inter-
vention. Of necessity, they will reflect the philosophical, social, political, and economic
views of both decision makers and the general public. We believe that too often these
decisions are presented as questions that can be resolved in an objective fashion by rely-
ing on scientific results. Such a presentation can conceal the interests of the parties mak-
ing the decision to the detriment of those whom the decisions affect. Despite these reser-
vations, a deepened understanding ofissues ofgenetics and behavior should contribute to
an appreciation ofthe wealth ofhuman diversity and ofthe untappedpotentiality inherent
in each ofus.
In our view, an understanding of the relationship between genetics and the environ-
ment shows that an individual is no less responsible for her biologically based behavior
than for herenvironmentally basedbehavior. Even those studies thatappear to argue most
strongly for a genetic basis for one or another behavioral trait can be interpreted to pro-
vide evidence of the importance of personal choice and the environment in the assump-
tion ofpersonality characteristics orthedevelopmentofspecific abilities.
As we enter an era when more and more genes associated with behavioral traits will
be discovered, it is crucial that scientists learn how topresent the results and discuss their
implications (or lack of implications) in a responsible way to the public. If not, we fear,
these studies may continue the history ofthe use ofbiological theories ofhuman behavior
for the purpose ofjustifying discrimination and inequality.
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